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PHILOSOPHY OF SCIENCE 
THE STRICTURES OF SCIENTIFIC RELATIVISM 
Charles J. Dougherty 
Department of Philosophy 
Creighton University 
Omaha, Nebraska 68178 
Few recent works have generated as much intellectual discussion 
as Thomas S. Kuhn's The Structure of Scientific Revolutions. Yet given 
the impact this book has had on our understanding of science-its role 
in the demise of logical positivism, in the current outpouring of interest 
in the history of science, and in changes in science education - perhaps 
it is time now, some ten years after Kuhn's provocative Postscript, 
for still another look at his thesis. That is the purpose of this study. 
First, those elements of Kuhn's book which committed him to a scienti-
fic relativism are reconstructed. Secondly, this relativism is critiqued from 
several rather different points of view. Finally, the position is defended 
that Kuhn's view of science is suspect because it generates two para-
doxes, one self-referential and one existential, and because his analysis 
is considered inadequate both from a pragmatic and a phenomenologi-
cal perspective. 
t t t 
I. 
By now Kuhn's (1970) central conceptual contribution is 
well-known. The history of science is a dynamic of paradigm-
based normal science, progressively elaborating and confirm-
ing itself; revolutionary episodes, proliferating a consciousness 
of anomaly and innovative response to anomaly; and the re-
establishment of normal science based on consensus around a 
new paradigm. Were this the whole of Kuhn's thesis, his book 
would have been philosophically non-controversial. Philoso-
phers, of course, knew that science and scientific theories had 
developed, and that that development was not without its 
own peculiar paroxysms. What was (and what remains) philo-
sophically controversial was Kuhn's understanding of para-
digm. 
Although paradigm is used throughout Kuhn's book and 
is re-examined critically in his Postscript, it defies easy transla-
tion into other words. It is what the scientists of a given tradi-
tion share, that which makes fruitful communication between 
them possible, and that which allows for successful elaboration 
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of their world-view. Kuhn introduced the notion as an achieve-
ment or constellation of achievements so unprecedented as to 
galvanize a group of scientific adherents, and yet so open-
ended as to permit these adherents to accept the task of com-
pleting its promise in painstaking and detailed scientific 
work. The achievements of Isaac Newton formed a paradigm 
in this sense. As the matrix of views within which the disci-
pline functions, the paradigm provides laws, theories, defini-
tions, symbolic generalizations, mathematical and logical 
tools, techniques, instrumentation, and shared beliefs and 
values for its followers. More importantly for Kuhn, the para-
digm presented a concrete example or series of concrete exam-
ples for what counts as legitimate effort in that discipline. 
This latter sense of the paradigm as shared example also con-
tains the crucial philosophical claim of Kuhn's work: that a 
paradigm defines the world of the scientists who accept it and 
does so in a fashion which cannot be made fully explicit. 
Three dramatic consequences are entailed by Kuhn's 
theory of scientific paradigms. First, there are no facts inde-
pendent of a given scientific theory. The paradigm defines a 
world, not a way of seeing or interpreting the world. For Kuhn 
there was no access to the facts directly. Rather, they are al-
ways fact-for-a-paradigm; they are always theory-laden facts. 
This immediately eliminates the possibility of a correspondence 
theory of truth since there is no reality separate from the 
paradigm's reality against which the paradigm itself could be 
compared. (Indeed, the very notion of paradigm suggests a 
coherence theory of truth.) 
Secondly, since the paradigm is not capable of being 
made explicit, no rules can exhaust the import of a scientific 
tradition. More importantly, since the paradigm cannot be 
rationally articulated in full, there will always be non-rational 
elements in any individual's commitment or opposition to any 
paradigm. The decision to adopt any given paradigm at any 
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given point of its development is more akin to the commit-
ment of a political revolutionary or to a religious conversion 
than it is to the conclusion of a deductive syllogism. 
Finally, since each paradigm defines its own world, and 
there is no paradigm-independent world available to us, the 
historical movement of the scientific community from one 
paradigm to another is beyond rational appraisal. One can 
speak of progress only internal to a single paradigm; only here 
are there standards against which to measure progress, viz. 
the paradigm itself. Progress here becomes tautological. 
Again, since there is no access to the real without a paradigm, 
there is no way to represent meaningfully trans-paradigm 
progress. Progress here is empty. Furthermore, since each para-
digm defines its laws, theories, and beliefs in its own terms, 
paradigms are not even comparable. Instead, they are radically 
incommensurate. 
In more traditional philosophical terms, what Kuhn offered 
us is a scientific relativism. Scientific "truths" are relative to 
a given paradigm. This paradigm is not itself capable of being 
compared directly with the real. Nor may we assume that 
historical development will bring us increasingly more valid 
paradigms, since no two paradigms may be compared directly. 
Individual scientists and the community of scientists at large 
move from one paradigm to another for considerations not 
wholly rational, and where rational, not wholly explicit. If 
we accept this position, we shall have to relinquish the notion, 
in Kuhn's (1970: 170) own words, that " ... changes of para-
digm carry scientists and those who learn from them closer 
and closer to the truth." 
Two more points need to be made to complete our expo-
sition of Kuhn's relativism. The first issue is raised in the 
Postscript. In language which is quite unexpectedly material-
istic, Kuhn offered a finer-grained analysis of the epistemic 
roots of this relativism. Although we all may receive different 
sensations from a putatively similar experience, "under pain 
of solipsism" Kuhn held that we must posit the existence 
and immutability of identical stimuli. Thus, for example, 
three different perceptions of an orange by three different 
perceivers may result in three quite different sensations 
(say that of an orange, a peach, and a grapefruit); yet, to 
maintain a minimally common world we must, Kuhn as-
serted, say that three identical sets of orange-stimuli were 
present-even though stimuli are the sorts of things which 
can never, in principle, be known. These would-be things-
in-themselves are immediately and involuntarily transformed 
into sensations by way of neuro-cerebral mechanisms "fully 
governed by physical and chemical laws" (Kuhn, 1970: 
194). Scientific paradigms may therefore be regarded as 
this sort of neural processing writ large, the collective and 
involuntary physical and chemical laws of the scientific com-
munity. 
The second issue moves in just the opposite direction. As 
Kuhn's stimulus-to-sensation model completed his relativisll1 
at the micro-level, so his rejection of any God or trans-human 
natural intelligence completed it at the macro-level. If one is 
tempted to read the cunning of Reason into this dynamic 
of scientific development, Kuhn scotched the temptation by 
an explicit espousal of Darwin's conceptual transposition. 
The Structure of Scientific Revolutions, like Origin of Species, 
"recognizes no goal set either by God or nature" (Kuhn 
1970: 172). Since this is not a teleological process, we shali 
have to "learn to substitute evolution-from-what-we-do-know 
for evolution-toward-that-we-wish-to-know" (Kuhn, 1970: 
171). 
The world is now well lost. 
II. 
One of the great ironies in the history of philosophy is 
the paradox of the skeptic who claims to know that we can 
know nothing. Unless he makes no positive claim whatsoever, 
or is just plain evasive, his theory refutes itself. A similar 
conundrum faces the relativist. If his view is that all truths are 
relative to some perspective, one may validly counter that this 
is merely the relativists' perspective. If the relativists' rejoinder 
is that truth is relative not only from his perspective but from 
every conceivable perspective, he is well on his way to refuting 
himself by offering a non-relative claim. And to paraphrase 
Russell's remark on universals, if you have to admit one non-
relative claim, you might as well admit all that you need. Let 
us apply these general observations to Kuhn's own views. 
It is roughly true to say that, prior to the wide acceptance 
of Kuhn's thesis, the received philosophy of science in the 
English-speaking world was that of the Vienna Circle positi-
vists. At least, it is accurate to say that Kuhn himself saw the 
situation this way. In the "Introduction," for example, Kuhn 
claimed to be rebelling against a theory of science on which 
he was himself weaned intellectually. This theory was char-
acterized by strong separations between scientific fact and 
scientific theory, between sociology and epistemology, and 
between the context of discovery and the context of justifi-
cation. This theory minimized or ignored the role of history, 
personal factors, and the non-rational aspects of science in 
general in favor of emphasis on the rational methods of science 
and the development-by-accumulation model. Not only was 
it largely ahistorical, but it was also skeptical of the social 
sciences, and tended to accept the ultimate reducibility of the 
natural sciences to physics. This received view had character-
istic laws, theories, definitions, symbolic generalizations, 
mathematical and logical tools, techniques, and shared beliefs 
and values. Furthermore, there was considerable consensuS 
on the achievements they took as their shared examples, 
viz. the work of Carnap, Schlick, Russell, Ayer, the early 
Wittgenstein, and others. 
The point I am driving at ought to be clear by now. Prior 
to Kuhn's theory there existed another paradigm of under-
standing science. That this paradigm is philosophical and not 
strictly scientific does not blunt my point, since the posi-
tivists clearly viewed their work as scientific in the relevant 
sense and so did Kuhn. At the end of the "Introduction" he 
said of the received view that its various elements constitute 
"parts of a theory, and by doing so, subjects them to the same 
scrutiny regularly applied to theories in other fields." It suf-
fices to conclude this tangent to observe that the primary 
thrust of Kuhn's thesis is carried by empirical claims taken 
from the history of science. In sum, then, Kuhn's theory of 
science is a paradigm designed to replace the previous posi-
tivist's paradigm. 
If this is ·the case, then the full irony of Kuhn's position 
is upon us. Because of his stimulus-to-sensations epistemology, 
and the resultant claim that a paradigm defines a world, there 
is no paradigm-independent fact against which we can appraise 
the validity or truth of Kuhn's thesis. Because paradigms can-
not be compared, indeed, because critical terms like science, 
explanation, justification, and the like will literally mean dif-
ferent things to the positivist than they did to Kuhn, the two 
paradigms are strictly incommensurate. Therefore, we cannot 
even venture to say that Kuhn's views are truer than the 
positivists' views. Because there is no telos or macro-level 
progress in our developing theories of science, we cannot even 
say that there has been progress in understanding science. The 
most we can assert is that the not fully rational community 
of philosophers of science have become persuaded that Kuhn's 
approach is somehow a preferable paradigm, and that those 
who have resisted the paradigm change are getting older and 
dying out. 
This is Kuhn's version of the self-referential paradox of 
the relativist. If his view is correct, it is only correct from his 
own perspective and that of his followers. We cannot meaning-
ly say it is correct (or incorrect) in itself. In fact we have 
Kuhn's own affirmation of this. He told us (Kuhn, 1970: 
208) that his theory" ... need not be right, any more than 
any other theory .... " 
III. 
As the philosophical formulation of the relativists' para-
dox is merely the abstract expression of what in its concrete 
manifestation is the lived inconsistency of a person's life, so 
the paradox of Kuhn's thought expresses logically what is an 
existential contradiction for the scientist. To illustrate this 
point, let us consider from Kuhn's own point of view what 
it is that makes a person a scientist. 
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There is, Kuhn told us, a set of personal commitments 
without which no man can be a scientist. "The scientist 
must, for example, be concerned to understand the world and 
to extend the precision and scope with which it has been 
ordered" (Kuhn, 1970:42). This concern to know the world 
must be sufficiently strong to support what to an outsider 
appears to be rather tedious and painstaking detailed investi-
gations, what Kuhn called the puzzle-solving of normal science. 
Further, this drive must be strong enough to bind the indi-
vidual and his researches to the larger scientific community 
and its rigorous standards of professional conduct. These are 
among the considerations which set the project of science 
apart from other activities, in spite of the overall tendency of 
Kuhn's thesis to emphasize the similarities between science 
and politics, art, history, religion, etc. 
This commitment to know the world as it is accounts in 
part for the resistence within scientific communities to para-
digm change. The normal scientists of every paradigm period 
believe their paradigm provides direct access to the real. When 
faced with a continued awareness of anomaly, and the 
prospects of a radical change to a new paradigm, scientists 
experience acute personal crisis. This experience is similar, in 
a quite literal fashion, to the anxiety experienced by one 
wearing goggles which turn his world upside-down. Conse-
quently, scientists are loathe to face paradigm change. Never-
theless they will if, according to Kuhn, they become convinced 
that the new paradigm (the new world, if you will) solves the 
outstanding anomalies and presumably is a better tool for 
satisfying the scientists' overarching commitment to under-
stand the world. 
Now let us insert Kuhn's own paradigm into this situation. 
According to Kuhn, no scientist at any time can know that 
his paradigm is aiding him to see the world as the world is. 
In micro-terms, no scientist can ever break out of his sensa-
tions to compare them with his stimuli. On the macro-level, 
no scientist is justified in the belief in scientific progress across 
paradigm changes. Now, unless we assume the unlikely hypo-
thesis that what scientists really mean by understanding the 
world is understanding the paradigm-dependent world, we 
must conclude that if Kuhn was correct in his analysis (ignor-
ing the difficulties of that judgment itself), then scientists are 
doomed to be disappointed. Not only must each scientist 
continue to face the personal anxiety of various individual 
paradigm changes, but now he must do so without the illusion 
that something truer is in the offmg, or for that matter, is 
even available in an infinite run of scientific efforts. 
If Kuhn's views about the nature of the scientist's com-
mitment are accurate, then his position generates an ex-
istential paradox. One simply cannot assume what one must 
assume in order to make the existential choice to become a 
scientist. 
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N. 
Having taxed Kuhn with two paradoxes, I want to con-
tinue this critical analysis in two other directions. I will claim 
that Kuhn's work is inadequate from the perspective of any 
philosophy which takes human praxis to be a central focus and 
a primary vehicle for human self-understanding. Finally, I 
will offer some considerations designed to establish the inade-
quacy of his epistemological analysis from a phenomenological 
perspective. 
The philosophy of science paradigm, which Kuhn's views 
challenged, was largely that of the Vienna Circle, as has been 
pointed out above. Positivism, in spite of its animus toward 
metaphysics, was a highly rationalistic doctrine, relying ul-
timately on a priori arguments concerning the meaningfulness 
of propositions, the structure of scientific explanation, the 
roles of reason and emotions, and the like. Against this back-
ground Kuhn's work can be seen as a return to a much more 
empirical and human-centered approach to understanding 
science. Science, for Kuhn, was no ideal structure but the 
work of real persons with their real historical prejudices and 
failings. One might expect, then, that his views would be more 
compatible with philosophies like Marxism and Pragmatism, 
which emphasize the centrality of real human activity in his-
torical change. This expectation, however, is quite unwar-
ranted since Kuhn's work remains essentially a history of 
theory. 
From a Marxist perspective, The Structure of Scientific 
Revolutions may be considered a step in the right direction, 
but the absence of any attempt to uncover systematically the 
political and societal context of the rise of various paradigms 
or the relationship between political and scientific revolutions 
vitiates Kuhn's conclusions. The lack of any discussion of the 
role of concrete human needs, and the resultant demand for 
technologies to satisfy those needs, leaves the history of 
science divorced from human history; it is as though a scien-
tific paradigm were literally a different world that the scientist 
enters when he approaches the laboratory. Further, Kuhn's 
discussion of the tedium of the puzzle-solving activity of 
normal science seems profoundly incomplete without some 
discussion of professionalization and its relation to class 
structures. Finally, given Kuhn's frankness about the real-
world motivations of scientists, his work is remarkably free of 
any discussion of the role of economics in the development 
of science. 
A pragmatic critique cuts deeper than merely charging 
incompleteness. With the Marxist this perspective would also 
see the absence of a discussion of technological development 
as a critical lacuna in Kuhn's views, but, unlike the Marxist, 
the pragmatist is likely to see this lack as symptomatic of the 
more debilitating aspects of Kuhn's relativism. Quite simply, 
a pragmatist is likely to see a scientific theory which produces 
effective technologies not only as humanly better but truer as 
well. Kuhn's central error, from this perspective, is the assump_ 
tion of a spectator or intellectualist view of knowing. By 
contrast, for a pragmatist, scientific theories are not merely 
cognitive achievements but, if correct, are also instruments 
allowing us to adapt better to our human environment. SyS-
temic coherence is insufficient of itself to appraise the truth 
of a theory. The theory must also work. Effective technologies 
are indicative then of true theories. An increasing range of 
predictive and manipulative power over our environment and 
its scourges means increasing truth in our scientific theories as 
a whole. Otherwise it remains a mystery why some theories 
work and some do not; why, for example, the germ theory 
led to vaccines and the theory of humors did not. A pragmatist 
would surely find it odd for Kuhn to say that he is incapable 
of claiming scientific progress toward the truth while at the 
same time mankind is converting matter into energy, pene-
trating outer space, vanquishing smallpox, creating synthetic 
fabrics, and the like. 
Not only does a pragmatic perspective afford a means of 
recognizing progress at the macro-level of human history, but 
it also blunts the edge of Kuhn's incommensurability thesis, 
thus allowing for a sense in which two paradigms can be com-
pared directly. The thesis that two paradigms are incommen-
surate follows from the view that the meanings of the various 
terms of a paradigm take their significance from their place 
in the nexus of other terms composing the paradigm. These 
terms cannot derive their meaning from direct reference to the 
world since we have no access to a paradigm-independent 
world with which to compare them. For an intellectualist 
there is no alternative but to hold that they derive their mean-
ings from their cognitive role in the system of terms com-
posing the paradigm itself. Since each paradigm will be dif-
ferent to some extent from all others, the various relationships 
of terms are thereby altered, and no direct comparison of para-
digms is possible. A term like mass, for example, is necessarily 
and radically different when used by a Newtonian and an 
Einsteinian. 
If, however, we follow the pragmatic insight that terms, at 
least in part, are tools for action, we will have another alterna-
tive. A greater continuity can be recognized between two 
historically contiguous paradigms when the use of the term 
as an instrument for action maintains a large core of identity 
in both paradigms; this in spite of the admitted cognitive 
changes. Thus, we can say that though mass for a Newton-
ian and an Einsteinian is not identical, the great bulk of 
active uses of the term has remained sufficiently similar to be 
compared. And since we can do more at the sub-atomic 
and intergalactic levels with the Einsteinian notion, that 
one is truer. The pragmatist is unabashed: progress has been 
made. 
v. 
My final critical perspective on Kuhn's The Structure of 
Scientific Revolutions is that of the phenomenological tradi-
tion. Apparently by way of Polanyi, Kuhn has appropriated 
what has long been commonplace within that tradition, 
viz. the idea of implicit or horizonal knowledge. The insight 
here, in brief, is that any act of knowledge takes place within 
or against a background context which itself is not made 
explicit and perhaps is incapable of being made explicit. 
Kuhn, with Polyanyi, called this horizonal consciousness, 
tacit knowing, and it constitutes one of his major innovative 
claims, viz. that the content of a paradigm is not capable of 
being exhausted by any set of explicit rules. Thus, while a 
community of scientists is united in a world, it is a world of 
which none of them is wholly conscious, and one which allows 
for much divergence in explicit interpretation. Physicists of the 
eighteenth century, for example, would all recognize and 
respond positively to the achievements of Isaac Newton; 
yet, if they were asked to state what it was Newton had 
achieved, Kuhn would have expected a wide range-perhaps 
even a contradictory range-of responses. (A more common-
place example might be the recognition of a friend's face by 
three other mutual friends, who thereafter disagreed dramati-
cally in their various descriptions of the first friend's face.) 
Kuhn shared this position with as diverse a group as 
Polanyi, Merleau-Ponty, and the later Wittgenstein. It repre-
sents common coin among those who reject the positivist's 
goal of a completed system of wholly explicit knowledge 
claims. 
Thus, from a phenomenological point of view, Kuhn's 
idea of a paradigm has much to recommend it on this score. 
The difficulty that would arise is that Kuhn was not consistent 
enough in drawing out the implications of his rejection of the 
positivist's goal. A case in point is Kuhn's apparent loss of the 
world. Kuhn spoke time and again of the scientist's paradigm 
as defining a world for the scientist. Yet surely it is mistaken 
to say that scientists of one paradigm live in a different world 
than those of another paradigm. Kuhn's point, of course, is 
well taken: a scientific paradigm does focus on certain aspects 
of our common world; it does call us to attend to experience 
as though we were seeing a different world. Still there is a 
common lived-world that forms the implicit horizon beyond 
all scientific worlds. As difficult or impossible as it may be to 
make explicit the connections between the scientist's several 
worlds and the Lebenswelt we all share, surely we know in 
some quite valid sense of that word that the scientist eats 
dinner, sleeps, enjoys our common culture, ages, and dies in 
a fashion which puts a lie to the notion of a private scientific 
world. Making this same point in other terms altogether, 
scientists do not have a wholly private language. The chal-
lenge which eluded Kuhn is to describe the scientific language 
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game in such a way as to fit it into our common form of life. 
Perhaps this is due to an unconscious assumption that such a 
fit, such a connection between the scientific world-view and 
that of the non-scientist, must be an explicit one. Rather it 
may have the implicit connection of a family resemblance. 
Carrying this same point in another direction, Kuhn's 
book seems to try to make just this connection in its first 
edition. Kuhn here was moving away from the positivist's 
reduction-to-physics model and into the more human flux of 
history and the social sciences. If this was a positive sign to 
those seeking to unite science and the Lebenswelt, the Post-
script is a giant step backwards. Kuhn's neuro-cerebral analysis 
of knowing and his reduction of these processes to fully 
determined physical and chemical laws departed dramatically 
from the realm of the lived-world and embraced again the 
reductivist chimera of a wholly explicit physical interpreta-
tion of experience. 
Finally, from a phenomenological perspective, one must 
say that Kuhn's truncated dismissal of the teleological char-
acter of science must be inadequate if scientific knowing is 
at all co-extensive with knowing in its more ordinary versions. 
Our common experience reveals an irreducible telic compo-
nent-a drive into the future, a project for tomorrow. If 
this is the case, then we simply cannot substitute the non-
teleological evolution from-what-we-do-know for the teleo-
logical evolution to-what-we-wish-to-know. What-we-wish-to-
know is too central a part of the given transcendence of each 
moment's experience, and as such, is hardly to be eliminated 
from science, mankind's best hope for continued and or-
ganized understanding of the world. 
In conclusion, it has not been my purpose to present a 
balanced view of Kuhn's The Structure of Scientific Revolu-
tions. A balanced view would have to acknowledge Kuhn's 
achievements: the corrective his book supplied to the then-
dominant positivist views of science, his emphasis on the cen-
tral importance history plays in our understanding of science, 
his uncovering of the misleading view of science conveyed in 
science textbooks, and other accomplishments too widely 
known to need enumeration. Instead, my purpose here has 
been that of offering a critical re-appraisal in the hope that the 
time is now right to go beyond Kuhn's relativism and its 
strictures. 
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